Semi-quantum secret sharing using entangled states by Li, Qin et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
90
6.
18
66
v3
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  6
 Se
p 2
00
9
Semi-quantum secret sharing using entangled states
Qin Li,1 W. H. Chan,2 and Dong-Yang Long1
1Department of Computer Science, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
2Department of Mathematics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
(Dated: December 2, 2018)
Secret sharing is a procedure for sharing a secret among a number of participants such that only
the qualified subsets of participants have the ability to reconstruct the secret. Even in the presence
of eavesdropping, secret sharing can be achieved when all the members are quantum. So what
happens if not all the members are quantum? In this paper we propose two semi-quantum secret
sharing protocols using maximally entangled GHZ-type states in which quantum Alice shares a
secret with two classical parties, Bob and Charlie, in a way that both parties are sufficient to obtain
the secret, but one of them cannot. The presented protocols are also showed to be secure against
eavesdropping.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a service provider Alice wants to distribute
some secret information among clients, Bob and Charlie,
such that Bob and Charlie can obtain the secret informa-
tion through the cooperation, while one of them cannot.
Classical secret sharing has been proposed as a solution
[1, 2, 3]. A simple example is that Alice prepares a binary
bit string related to her secret message and generates a
random string of the same length, applies bitwise XOR
operations on such two strings, and then sends the re-
sulting string to Bob and a copy of the random string
to Charlie. Obviously, Bob and Charlie acting together
can access to Alice’s message, but one of them can obtain
nothing about it.
Unfortunately, classical secret sharing cannot address
the problem of eavesdropping if it is not used in con-
junction with other techniques such as encryption. If
an eavesdropper Eve (including one malicious partici-
pant of the Bob-Charlie pair) can control the communi-
cation channel and obtain both of Alice’s transmissions,
then Alice’s message becomes transparent for her. Fortu-
nately, quantum secret sharing can achieve secret sharing
and eavesdropping detection simultaneously. Hillery et
al. showed how to implement a secret sharing scheme us-
ing three-particle entangled Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) states [4] in the presence of an eavesdropper [5].
Karlsson et al. presented a secret sharing scheme based
on two-particle quantum entanglement such that only
two members implementing together are able to obtain
the information [6]. Gottesman showed that the size
of each important share sometimes can be made half
of the size of the secret if quantum states are used to
share a classical secret [7]. The secret sharing proto-
col among n parties based on entanglement swapping
of d-level cat states and Bell states was introduced by
Karimipour et al. [8]. Guo et al. proposed a secret
sharing scheme utilizing product states instead of entan-
gled states and thus the efficiency is improved to ap-
proach 100% [9]. Xiao et al. generalized the scheme in
Ref. [5] into any number of participants and gave two
efficient quantum secret sharing schemes with the effi-
ciency asymptotically 100% [10]. Zhang et al. consid-
ered a multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol of the
classical secret based on entanglement swapping of Bell
states [11]. There are also many quantum secret shar-
ing protocols considering sharing quantum information
[5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Especially,
Markham et al. developed a unified approach to secret
sharing of both classical and quantum secrets employing
graph states [20].
However, previous quantum secret sharing protocols
requires all the parties to have quantum capabilities. So
what happens if not all the parties are quantum? Actu-
ally, the situation that not all the participants can afford
expensive quantum resources and quantum operations is
more common in various applications. It is well known
that semi-quantum key distribution in which one party
Alice is quantum and the other party Bob just owns clas-
sical capabilities is possible [21, 22, 23], so it is interesting
to ask whether semi-quantum secret sharing (the specific
definition is given afterwards) is possible. The answer is
affirmative.
In this paper, we consider the secret sharing proto-
col in which quantum Alice has to share a secret with
classical Bob and classical Charlie such that the collab-
oration of Bob and Charlie can reconstruct the secret,
while one of them cannot obtain anything about the
secret. We say Alice is quantum when she is allowed
to prepare arbitrary quantum states and perform any
quantum operations. We follow the descriptions about
“classical” in Refs. [21, 22, 23]. The computation ba-
sis {|0〉, |1〉} is called “classical” and is replaced with the
classical notations {0, 1}. Bob and Charlie is classical
when they are restricted to performing four operations
when they access a segment of the quantum channel:
(1) measuring the qubits in the classical basis {0, 1};
(2) reordering the qubits (via proper delay measures);
(3) preparing (fresh) qubits in the classical basis {0, 1};
(4) sending or returning the qubits without disturbance.
The protocol of this kind is termed as “Semi-Quantum
Secret Sharing (SQSS)”. SQSS protocols can have two
2variants, randomization-based SQSS and measure-resend
SQSS, in terms of the operations which classical partic-
ipants are allowed to implement. In a randomization-
based SQSS protocol, classical participants are limited
to perform the operations (1), (2), and (4), while in a
measure-resend SQSS protocol, classical participants are
limited to perform the operations (1), (3), and (4). In
principle, a SQSS protocol is considered as secure if nei-
ther an eavesdropper nor a malicious participant can ob-
tain any information about the secret. In the follow-
ing section, we utilize maximally entangled states of the
GHZ type to construct a randomization-based SQSS pro-
tocol and a measure-resend SQSS protocol based on the
semi-quantum key distribution protocols [21, 22, 23], and
we show that the proposed SQSS protocols are secure
against eavesdropping.
II. THREE-PARTICLE ENTANGLED STATES
In order to construct semi-quantum secret sharing pro-
tocols, we introduce a three-particle maximally entangled
state in the following form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
+ |1〉 |01〉+ |10〉√
2
). (1)
This state also can be rewritten as
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |++〉+ | − −〉√
2
+ |1〉 |++〉 − | − −〉√
2
)
=
|0〉+ |1〉√
2
|++〉√
2
+
|0〉 − |1〉√
2
| − −〉√
2
=
|+++〉+ | − −−〉√
2
. (2)
Obviously, by implementing Hadamard operation on each
particle of the state |ψ〉 respectively, |ψ〉 is transformed
into the standard GHZ state, |GHZ〉 = |000〉+|111〉√
2
. Ac-
cording to Ref. [24], if two three-particle entangled states
can be mutually transformed by local unitary operations,
they are equivalent. Hence, as an entangled state, |ψ〉 is
equivalent to the standard GHZ state and belongs to the
GHZ type.
The GHZ-type state |ψ〉 is not only theoretically exis-
tent but also practically feasible. It can be obtained from
the standard GHZ state, and also can be generated in the
following way. To gain |ψ〉, we may begin with preparing
the state |0〉 and the Bell state |00〉+|11〉√
2
, and then apply
the Hadamard gate to the first qubit, and finally apply
the controlled-NOT gate to the first two qubits. The spe-
cific steps are illustrated by the quantum circuit showed
in Figure 1. Let us follow the states in the circuit to see
clearly the process of generating |ψ〉. The input state of
circuit is
|ψ0〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |00〉+ |11〉√
2
. (3)
|0〉 H t
|00〉+|11〉√
2
( L
✻ ✻ ✻
|ψ0〉 |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉
FIG. 1: Quantum circuit for generating |ψ〉
After sending the first qubit through the Hadamard gate,
we have
|ψ1〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
⊗ |00〉+ |11〉√
2
=
1√
2
(|0〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
+ |1〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
). (4)
Then we send the first two qubits through the controlled-
NOT gate to obtain
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
+ |1〉 |10〉+ |01〉√
2
)
= |ψ〉. (5)
III. RANDOMIZATION-BASED SQSS
PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a randomization-based
SQSS protocol in which quantum Alice and the other two
classical parties, Bob and Charlie, share a secret string
such that Bob and Charlie can recover the secret string
only when they work together. Quantum Alice has the
ability to prepare the maximally entangled GHZ-type
state |ψ〉 and perform some quantum operations such
as Bell measurements and three-particle measurements.
Classical parties, Bob and Charlie, are restricted to im-
plementing three operations: (1) measuring the qubits
in the classical basis {0, 1}; (2) reordering the qubits
(via proper delay measures); (3) sending or returning
the qubits without disturbance. All the participants can
access a quantum channel and an authenticated public
channel that is susceptible to eavesdropping. The de-
tailed steps are given in the following.
1. Alice creates a sufficiently long string of three-
particle entangled states in the form of Eq. (1) (Suppose
N triplet states are in the string and theses states are
indexed from 1 to N). After that, Alice sends the second
and the third particle of each entangled state to Bob and
Charlie, and keeps the remaining for herself.
2. Upon receiving each qubit, Bob randomly deter-
mines, either to measure the qubit using the classical
3TABLE I: Participants’ actions on the qubits in each position
Case Bob Charlie Alice
(1) SHARE SHARE ACTION 1 a
(2) SHARE CHECK ACTION 2 b
(3) CHECK SHARE ACTION 3 c
(4) CHECK CHECK ACTION 4 d
aMeasuring her qubit in the classical basis {0, 1}
bCombining her qubit with Charlie’s reflected qubit and perform-
ing a Bell measurement
cCombining her qubit with Bob’s reflected qubit and performing
a Bell measurement
dCombining her qubit with the two reflected qubits and perform-
ing an appropriate three-particle measurement
basis {0, 1} (we refer to this action as “SHARE”), or
to reflect it back to Alice (we refer to this action as
“CHECK”). Particularly, Bob reflects the qubits in a
new order such that nobody else could distinguish which
qubits are returned. Each measurement outcome is in-
terpreted as a binary 0 or 1. Similarly, Charlie also ran-
domly decides either to measure the qubits or to reflect
the qubits in another order.
3. Alice temporarily restores the qubits reflected by
Bob and Charlie in quantum registers according to their
incoming sequences, and announces that she has received
their reflected particles in a public channel.
4. Bob and Charlie declare which qubits were reflected
by them and the order in which their qubits were re-
turned, respectively.
5. For her own qubit in each position, Alice performs
one of the four actions according to Bob’s and Charlie’s
actions on the corresponding qubits, as illustrated in Ta-
ble I.
It is supposed that there are four cases appearing in
the same probability: (1) both Bob and Charlie choose
to SHARE, then Alice can implement ACTION 1 to ob-
tain a bit (we name this bit as SHARE bit) that can be
retrieved if Bob and Charlie use the XOR operation on
their measurement outcomes; (2) Bob chooses to SHARE
and Charlie chooses to CHECK, then Alice can perform
ACTION 2 to check whether Bob’s measurement out-
come is right and the resulting two-particle state is the
correct Bell state; (3) Bob chooses to CHECK and Char-
lie chooses to SHARE, then Alice can utilize ACTION 3
to check if Charlie’s measurement result is right and the
resulting two-particle state is the correct Bell state; and
(4) both Bob and Charlie choose to CHECK, then Alice
can check whether the original three-particle entangled
states in the form of Eq. (1) is changed by carrying out
ACTION 4.
For instance, let Bob randomly measure the qubits in
N/2 positions (SHARE) and reflect the qubits in the
other N/2 positions in a new order lB = l1l2 · · · lN/2
(CHECK), and Charlie performs the similar operations
as Bob does and reflects the qubits in another order
mC = m1m2 · · ·mN/2. Suppose N = 8, lB = 4731
and mC = 6427. Then the lists of the qubits measured
by Bob and Charlie are indexed by their complements
l¯B = 2568 and m¯C = 1358, respectively. Hence Alice
performs ACTION 1 in the positions 5 and 8 and inter-
prets the measurement outcomes as classical bits 0 or 1,
and performs ACTION 4 in the positions 4 and 7. Alice
also implements ACTION 2 in the positions 2 and 6 and
ACTION 3 in the positions 1 and 3.
6. Alice checks the error rate in cases (2), (3), and
(4) given in Table I. If the error rate in any case is
higher than some predefined threshold value, the protocol
aborts.
7. Alice requires Bob and Charlie to reveal a random
subset (assume the size of the subset is about N/8) of
the bits which are used to generate Alice’s SHARE bits.
Actually this process is used to check the error rate in
case (1). If the values of Bob’s and Charlie’s bits are the
same (or opposite), then Alice’s bit should be 0 (or 1)
according to the Eq. (1). From step 5, we know that
approximately N/4 positions are selected by both Bob
and Charlie to SHARE. If the error rate on SHARE bits
is not significant, the remainingN/8 SHARE bits of Alice
forms the final secret string which can be recovered only
when Bob and Charlie work together.
We show the above randomization-based SQSS proto-
col is secure against eavesdropping in two situations. The
first is that one dishonest classical party Bob (or Charlie)
attempts to find Alice’s secret without cooperating with
the other party in the recovery stage. The second is that
a fourth eavesdropper Eve who has quantum capabilities
is involved and aims to find Alice’s secret without being
detected.
We first suppose the dishonest classical party Bob can
access both of Alice’s transmissions. In some of the po-
sitions, Bob may measure both qubits using the classical
basis {0, 1} and resend one of them in the state he found
to Charlie. In terms of the Eq. (1), if both of the mea-
surement outcomes are the same (or opposite), he learns
that Alice’s bit must be 0 (or 1). In the other posi-
tions, Bob may behave like a honest party and do noth-
ing on Charlie’s qubits. However, this cheating strategy
can hardly succeed since Bob does not know Charlie’s
choices. If Bob measures Charlie’s qubit in the position
where Charlie chooses to CHECK, he suffers a problem.
According to the state |ψ〉 in Eq. (1), if Bob just mea-
sures his own qubit, then the two-particle state result-
ing from combining Alice’s qubit and Charlie’s reflected
qubit should be the Bell state, while if Bob measures both
qubits of him and Charlie, then the two-particle state
resulting from combining Alice’s qubit and Charlie’s re-
flected qubit will be the product state, and thus Alice
will find this abnormity with probability 1/2 using a Bell
measurement. But if Bob measures Charlie’s qubit in the
position where Charlie chooses to SHARE, his cheating
will not be found. In each position, Charlie has a prob-
ability of 1/2 of making either choice, so the probability
that Bob escapes detection is 1/2× 1/2+1/2 = 3/4. As-
sume that Bob has to measure both qubits in l(l ≤ N/4)
positions to obtain the significant information of Alice’s
4secret without the aid of Charlie, then the probability
that Bob goes undetected is (3/4)l which may be arbi-
trarily small by picking an appropriate l and N .
Now let us consider the second case in which a fourth
party Eve who has quantum capabilities is involved. As-
sume that Eve can obtain both of Alice’s transmissions
and tries to obtain Alice’s secret. If Eve gets Bob’s and
Charlie’s qubits of certain entangled states, she may mea-
sure the two qubits in the Bell basis and then resend
the qubits in the states she found to Bob and Charlie,
respectively. In terms of Eq. (1), if the measurement
outcome is |00〉+|11〉√
2
, Eve learns that Alice’s bit should
be 0; otherwise she knows that Alice’s bit should be 1.
However, Eve’s cheating is likely to be detected since
she does not know Bob’s and Charlie’s choices. If she
measures the qubits in the position where both Bob and
Charlie choose to CHECK, then the three-particle state
resulting from combining Alice’s qubit and the other two
reflected qubits will be the product of one single state
and a Bell state but not the same as the original state
|ψ〉 in the form of Eq. (1), and thus Alice can discover
this defraud with the probability 1/2 by measuring it
in a three-particle orthogonal basis {|φ0〉, |φ1〉, ..., |φ7〉},
where
|φ0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
+ |1〉 |01〉+ |10〉√
2
),
|φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
− |1〉 |01〉+ |10〉√
2
),
|φ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |00〉 − |11〉√
2
+ |1〉 |01〉 − |10〉√
2
),
|φ3〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |00〉 − |11〉√
2
− |1〉 |01〉 − |10〉√
2
),
|φ4〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
+ |0〉 |01〉+ |10〉√
2
),
|φ5〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 |00〉+ |11〉√
2
− |0〉 |01〉+ |10〉√
2
),
|φ6〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 |00〉 − |11〉√
2
+ |0〉 |01〉 − |10〉√
2
),
|φ7〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 |00〉 − |11〉√
2
− |0〉 |01〉 − |10〉√
2
). (6)
Similarly, if Eve measures the qubits either in the posi-
tion where Bob chooses to SHARE and Charlie chooses to
CHECK, or in the position where Bob selects to CHECK
and Charlie selects to SHARE, she also can be detected
with probability 1/2 by implementing a Bell measure-
ment. But if Eve measures the qubits in the position
where both Bob and Charlie choose to SHARE, she can-
not be detected. In every position, as Bob and Char-
lie have a probability of 1/2 of choosing to SHARE or
CHECK, the probability that Eve’s cheating is unde-
tected is 1/4 × 1/2 × 3 + 1/4 = 5/8. Suppose there are
m(m ≤ N/4) positions where Bob should measure the
qubits in a Bell basis to learn the considerable informa-
tion of the secret, then Bob’s cheating goes undetected
with probability (5/8)m which can be small enough by
choosing a suitable m and N . In addition, Eve also ob-
tains nothing about Alice’s secret information even if she
manages to entangle an ancilla with each qubit of Bob
(or Charlie). Suppose that in a certain position, Eve has
entangled an ancilla |0〉 with Bob’s qubit, and both Bob
and Charlie measure their qubits, then the Alice-Eve sys-
tem collapses to |00〉 or |10〉, which leaks no information
to Eve about Alice’s qubit.
Particularly, notice that it is indispensable for Alice to
announce that she has received all the reflected particles
in step 3. If Eve can learn which qubits were reflected
by Bob and Charlie and in which order they were re-
flected before Alice receives the reflected qubits, he can
obtain the secret string of Alice without inducing errors
by using the similar way to attack the mock protocol
in Refs. [21, 22, 23]. For each incoming qubit of Bob,
she entangles an ancilla |0〉 with it and implements a
controlled-NOT operation on them (Bob’s qubit as the
control qubit and the ancilla qubit as the target qubit).
Then she holds all the qubis that Bob reflected until Bob
publishes which qubits were reflected and in which order
they were reflected. Next she rearranges the reflected
quits in the same order as Alice sent them to Bob and
performs another controlled-NOT operation on each re-
turned qubit and the corresponding ancilla. After that,
she resends the resulting qubits in the order that Bob de-
clared to Alice. Finally, in the position where Bob chose
to SHARE, she measures her ancilla and learns Bob’s
bit. For the qubits sent to Charlie, Eve does the simi-
lar operations and learns Charlie’s bits. In the position
where both Bob and Charlie chose to SHARE, Eve can
obtain the SHARE bit by implementing XOR operation
on their bits according to Eq. (1). Moreover, Eve goes
undetected since she introduces no errors.
IV. MEASURE-RESEND SQSS PROTOCOL
In the following, a measure-resend SQSS protocol is in-
troduced. Quantum Alice can prepare the three-particle
GHZ-type state |ψ〉 and perform some quantum opera-
tions and classical parties, Bob and Charlie, are restricted
to performing three operations: (1) measuring the qubits
in the classical basis {0, 1}; (2) preparing (fresh) qubits
in the classical basis {0, 1}; (3) sending or returning the
qubits without disturbance. This protocols is quite sim-
5ilar to the randomization-based SQSS protocol except
that step 2 and step 4 are adapted to the different re-
strictions of classical participants, so the modified steps
are given as follows:
2. When Bob (or Charlie) receives each qubit he ran-
domly determines, either to measure it in the classical
basis {0, 1} and return it in the same state he found
(SHARE), or to reflect it directly (CHECK).
4. Bob and Charlie declare the positions in which the
qubits were measured (or reflected).
The proposed measure-resend SQSS protocol is secure
against eavesdropping in a way similar to that in the
randomization-based SQSS protocol. A dishonest party
Bob (or Charlie) should not find Alice’s secret without
collaborating with the other party and a fourth eaves-
dropper Eve who has quantum capabilities also should
not obtain Alice’s secret without disturbance. Suppose
Bob is dishonest and he has controlled both of Alice’s
transmissions. In some of the positions, Bob measures
both particles and resends one of them to Charlie. How-
ever, if Charlie does not measure the qubits in such po-
sitions, the Alice-Charlie systems should collapse to the
Bell states but not product states, which might be discov-
ered by Alice through implementing Bell measurements.
Likewise, assume that a fourth party Eve who owns quan-
tum capabilities has managed to obtain both Bob’s and
Charlie’s particles. In certain positions, Eve measures the
two qubits in the Bell basis and then resends the qubits
to Bob and Charlie, respectively. However, if either Bob
or Charlie does not measure their qubits in such posi-
tions, Eve’s cheating will be detected by Alice through
performing appropriate measurements. Besides, even if
Eve manages to entangle an ancilla with each qubit of
Bob (or Charlie), she also obtains nothing about Alice’s
secret since the ancilla is always left unchanged.
Note that it is also significant to demand Alice to pub-
lish that she has received all the reflected qubits in step 3
of this protocol. If this requirement is loss, Eve can cheat
successfully. For instance, Eve holds the reflected qubits
from Bob and Charlie until they announce the positions
in which the qubits were measured and resent (SHARE),
or reflected directly (CHECK). Then Eve measures the
qubits that they measured and then resends them in the
states she found, and reflects the qubits that they re-
flected without disturbance. In the position where both
Bob and Charlie measured their qubits, if Eve’s measure-
ments are the same, then she learns Alice’s bit must be 0;
otherwise she learns Alice’s bit must be 1. Furthermore,
Eve can escape detection since she does not introduce
disturbance anywhere.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have introduce a maximally entangled GHZ-type
state and shown that it is not only theoretically existent
but also practically feasible. Furthermore, we has used
such GHZ-type states to propose two semi-quantum se-
cret sharing protocols in which Alice has quantum ca-
pabilities, while the other two parties, Bob and Charlie,
are limited to classical operations: measure qubits in the
classical basis {0, 1}; send or reflect qubits without dis-
turbance; reorder some qubits or prepare fresh qubits
after measurements and resend them. The proposed pro-
tocols also have been showed to be secure against eaves-
dropping. Since the proposed SQSS protocols do not
require all the participants owning quantum capabilities,
the secret sharing can be achieved at a lower cost. There-
fore, the applicability of secret sharing could be widen to
the situation in which not all the participants can afford
expensive quantum resources and quantum operations.
Nevertheless, we just consider the case that quan-
tum Alice shares a secret with two classical parties, Bob
and Charlie. An interesting question is: can a general
SQSS protocol in which quantum Alice shares a secret
with several parties who may be quantum or classical
be achieved? Besides, note that no noise were assumed
and so that three participants, namely, Alice, Bob, and
Charlie, can share perfect entangled states if eavesdrop-
pers introduce no errors. So another interesting question
is: can entangled states can be shared of almost perfect
fidelity if not all the parties are quantum when noisy
quantum channels are used?
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